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ABSTRACT
Naval Aviation has expanded its efforts to eliminate mis-
haps; especially those linked to human error. This focus
was expanded to cover not only aircrew error, but main-
tainor error as well. To examine maintenance error, the
Naval Safety Center's Human Factors Accident Classifi-
cation System (HFACS) was adapted to analyze eight fis-
cal years of major maintenance mishaps. The HFACS
Maintenance Extension effectively profiled the nature of
maintenance errors and depicted the latent supervisory
and maintainer conditions that "set the stage" for subse-
quent unsafe maintainer acts.
INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Coalition's victory
in Desert Storm, the U.S. Armed Forces have faced bud-
getary constraints and manpower reductions despite a
need to sustain mission readiness and meet operational
requirements. Naval Aviation, which asserts U.S.
National Policy around the world through power projec-
tion, has been affected by this trend. Today, the conser-
vation of resources is emphasized and the loss of assets
due to mishaps is heavily scrutinized.
Figure 1 . Average Flight Mishap Rate by Decade
Naval Aviation dramatically reduced its Class A Flight
Mishaps (FM) over the past 50 years, and in fact has cut
the rate in half each decade since 1950 (see Figure 1). 1
This decline is mainly attributed to the adoption of several
engineering and administrative controls (see Figure 2).2
Figure 2. Naval Aviation Safety Initiatives
Unfortunately, it appears that the declining rate has lev-
eled off in the mid-90s and that the much anticipated 50
percent reduction would not be realized this decade (see
Figure 3).1 Some view, in economic terms, that the
present FM rate is a "fixed cost" of doing business that
cannot be reduced.
Figure 3. Class A Flight Mishap Rate for Last 10 FYs
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In examining Naval Aviation Class A FMs for FYs 90-97,
it was determined that Aircrew Error (58%) was a pre-
dominant causal factor, followed by Material Failures
(38%) and Maintenance Error (16%). Supervisory Fail-
ures (60%), including aircrew management, aircraft
design, maintenance management, and logistical sup-
port, were very pervasive (see Figure 4).2 It is now
accepted that 80% of Class A FMs are in part due to
human error. For example, 23 of the 27 Class A FMs for
FY 97 (85%) were directly attributable to human error.
Figure 4. FY 90-97 Class A FM Determined Causal Factors
Partitioning all mishaps for the past three decades into
those, which were purely due to material/mechanical fail-
ure or in part due to human error, reveals two distinct
trends. Human error did not decline at the same rate as
material/mechanical failure, and as of late, human error
has not only leveled off but may be increasing (see Fig-
ure 5).3 Consequently this recognized leveling off of the
Naval Aviation mishap rate underscores the need to more
effectively combat all forms of human error.
Figure 5. Human Error vs. Material Failure in Mishaps
HUMAN FACTORS QUALITY MANAGEMENT
BOARD
Following the 1996 F-14 Mishap in Nashville, TN, the
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific empanelled a
Human Factors Quality Management Board (HFQMB) to
identify human factors threats and develop interventions
against them. The goal was to cut the mishap rate in half
by reducing human error. The HFQMB adopted three
processes to study human error in mishaps: mishap data
analysis to identify hazards and risks, benchmarking to
uncover best practices and find process improvements,
and climate assessment to evaluate safety posture.
Given the total number of Class A FMs having aircrew
error, Naval Aviation leadership targeted it first along with
related supervisory error.4
The HFQMB had encouraging results in its first 18
months of existence. The Navy FM rate dropped to its
lowest point ever, and overall, Naval Aviation had its sec-
ond best FM rate in history. This success, coupled with a
Naval Air Systems Command drive to address issues
related to aging aircraft, compelled the HFQMB to exam-
ine maintenance related mishaps (MRMs) using the
same processes.5
HUMAN FACTORS ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM - MAINTENANCE EXTENSION
The Human Factors Accident Classification System
(HFACS) was developed by the Naval Safety Center to
analyze human errors contributing to Naval Aviation FMs.
HFACS incorporates features of Bird's "Domino Theory,"
Edward's "SHEL Model," and Reason's "Swiss Cheese
Model." Latent conditions and active failures are parti-
tioned into one of three top-level categories (see Figure
6).6
Figure 6. HFACS Top-Level Categories
HHanavv
These categories enable an analyst to identify failures at
each of the three levels historically related to accidents:
supervisory condition, operator condition, and operator
act. These classifications are then used to target appro-
priate intervention strategies.
A Maintenance Extension taxonomy for HFACS was
developed to classify causal factors that contribute to
MRMs. This addition to HFACS consists of four broad
human error categories: Supervisory Conditions (latent),
Working Conditions (latent), Maintainer Conditions
(latent), and Maintainer Acts (active). The three orders of
maintenance error: first, second, and third reflect a
decomposition of the error types from a molar to a micro
perspective (see Table 1)7
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Table 1 . HFACS Maintenance Extension Categories
First Order Second Order Third Order





Failed to Correct Problem
Supervisory Violation
























The following paragraphs provide a brief illustration of the
HFACS Maintenance Extension taxonomy levels:
Latent Supervisory Conditions that can contribute to an
active failure includes both unforeseen and squadron.
Examples of unforeseen supervisory conditions include:
• An engine that falls off of a stand during a change-
out evolution due to an unforeseen hazard of a high
seas state (Hazardous Operation)
• A manual omits a step in a maintenance procedure,
such as leaving out an o-ring that causes a fuel leak
(Inadequate Documentation)
• The poor layout of system components that do not
permit direct observation of maintenance being per-
formed (Inadequate Design)
Examples of squadron supervisory conditions include:
• A supervisor who does not ensure that maintenance
personnel are wearing required personal protective
gear (Inadequate Supervision)
• A supervisor who directs a maintainer to perform a
task without considering risks, such as driving a truck
through a hangar (Inappropriate Operations)
• A supervisor who neglects to correct maintainers
who routinely bend the rules when they perform a
common task (Failed to Correct Problem)
• A supervisor who willfully orders a maintainer to
wash an aircraft without proper safety gear (Supervi-
sory Violation)
Latent Maintainer Conditions that can contribute to an
active failure include medical, crew coordination, and
readiness.
Examples of maintainer medical conditions include:
• A maintainer who has a marital problem and cannot
focus on a maintenance action (Mental State)
• A maintainer who worked for 20 hours straight and
suffers from fatigue (Physical State)
• A maintainer who is short can not visually inspect air-
craft before it is launched (Physical Limitation).
Examples of maintainer crew coordination conditions
include:
• A maintainer who leads a taxiing aircraft into another
due to improper hand signals (Communication)
• A maintainer who performs a task, not in accordance
with standard procedures, because the maintainer
was overly submissive to a superior (Assertiveness)
• A maintainer who downplays a downing discrepancy
to meet the flight schedule (Adaptability)
Examples of maintainer readiness conditions include:
• A maintainer who is working on an aircraft skipped
the requisite OJT evolution (Training)
• A maintainer who engages in a procedure that they
have not been qualified to perform (Certification)
• A maintainer who is intoxicated on the job (Violation)
Latent Working Conditions that can contribute to an
active failure include environmental, equipment, and
workspace.
Examples of environmental working conditions include:
• A maintainer who is working at night on the flightline
does not see a tool he left behind (Lighting/Light)
• A maintainer who is securing an aircraft in a driving
rain fails to properly attach the chains (Weather)
• A maintainer who is working on a pitching deck falls
from the aircraft (Environmental Hazard)
Examples of equipment working conditions include:
• A maintainer who is using a defective test set does
not precheck it before troubleshooting (Damaged)
• A maintainer who starts working on landing gear
without a jack because all in use (Unavailable)
• A maintainer who uses an old manual because a CD-
ROM reader is not available (Dated)
Examples of workspace working conditions include:
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• A maintainer who is working in a hangar bay cannot
properly position the maintenance stand (Confining)
• A maintainer who is spotting an aircraft with his view
obscured by catapult steam (Obstructed)
• A maintainer who is unable to perform a corrosion
inspection that is beyond his reach (Inaccessible)
Maintainer Acts are active failures, which directly or indi-
rectly cause mishaps, or lead to Latent Maintenance
Condition, they include errors and violations.
Examples of errors in maintainer acts include:
• A maintainer who misses a hand signal and backs a
forklift into an aircraft (Attention)
• A maintainer who is very familiar with a procedure
may reverse steps in a sequence (Memory)
• A maintainer who inflates an aircraft tire to a pres-
sure required by a different aircraft (Rule)
• A maintainer who roughly handles a delicate engine
valve causing damage (Skill)
Examples of violations in maintainer acts include:
• A maintainer who engages in practices, condoned by
management, that bend the rules (Routine)
• A maintainer who strays from accepted procedures
to save time, bending a rule (Infraction)
• A maintainer who willfully breaks standing rules dis-
regarding the consequences (Exceptional)
Following the HFACS Maintenance Extension Model
Supervisory, Maintainer, and Working Conditions are
latent factors that can impact a maintainer's performance
and can contribute to an active failure, an Unsafe Main-
tainer Act (see Figure 7)7
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An Unsafe Maintainer Act may lead directly to a mishap
or injury. For example, a maintainer runs a forklift into the
side of an aircraft and damages it. The Unsafe Maintainer
Act could also become a latent Maintenance Condition,
which the aircrew would have to deal with on take-off, in-
flight, or on landing. For example, an improperly rigged
landing gear that collapses on touchdown or an over-
torqued hydraulics line that fails in flight causing a fire. It
is important to note that Supervisory Conditions related
to design for maintainability, prescribed maintenance pro-
cedures, and standard maintenance operations could be
inadequate and lead directly to a Maintenance Condition.
HFACS ANALYSIS OF CLASS A FY 90-97 MRMS
During FY 90-97 there was a total of 63 Class A Mishaps,
of which 61 were Flight, 0 were Flight Related, and 2
were Aircraft Ground. Two Navy Maintenance Officers
and two Navy Chiefs used the HFACS Maintenance
Extension to classify the human factors causes reported
in these mishaps (see Figure 8).7
Figure 8. HFACS Profile Of Class A MRMs
They discovered the following profile of human errors in
MRMs:
Supervisory Conditions - 67% of all Naval Aviation Class
A MRMs reported Squadron Supervisory Conditions,
whereas 21% had Unforeseen Supervisory Conditions
(not shown).
Maintainer Conditions - 21% of all Naval Class A MRMs
reported Medical, CRM, or Readiness Maintainer Condi-
tions. Note: Maintainer Conditions were under reported,
more are likely present and have an effect.
Working Conditions - 3% of all Naval Class A MRMs
reported Environment, Equipment, or Workspace Work-
ing Conditions. Note: Workspace Conditions were under
reported, more are likely present and have an effect.
Maintainer Acts - 75% of all Naval Aviation Class A
MRMs reported Maintainer Errors, whereas 40% had
Maintainer Violations.
Clearly, latent conditions in the form of Supervisory,
Maintainer, and Workspace factors are present that can
impact maintainers in the performance of their jobs.
However, many Maintainer and Workspace Conditions
are not reported due to the reporting system in place,
perceptions of accident causation, or culture/climate
issues. Specifically, inadequate supervision of mainte-
nance evolutions, not ensuring personnel are trained
and/or qualified, not enforcing rules, and poor communi-
cation characterize the majority of latent Supervisory
Conditions. Poor passdown, coordination, and communi-
cation; non-use or lack of publications, policies, and pro-
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cedures; and fatigue comprise most latent maintainer
conditions. Finally, most Maintainer Errors reflect a lack
of training, experience, and skill, whereas Maintainer Vio-
lations consist of routine non-compliance with standard
procedures and practices, and infractions, bending the
rules in order to meet mission requirements and the flight
schedule.
CONCLUSIONS
The HFACS Maintenance Extension was effective in cap-
turing the nature of and relationships among latent condi-
tions and active failures present in Class A MRMs. The
insights gained provide a solid perspective for the devel-
opment of potential intervention strategies. The major
mishaps analyzed were primarily FMs, meaning that
many imposed in-flight Maintenance Conditions on air-
crew. During FYs 90-97 there were almost 500 MRMs in
Naval Aviation, many of which were of lesser severity and
were either Flight Related or Aircraft Ground Mishaps.
Such mishaps involve primarily ground and ramp activi-
ties and can lead directly to a mishap or injury. Conse-
quently, the present profile and observed relationships
only hold for the mishaps considered and cannot be gen-
eralized to all MRMs. Further, it can be contended inter-
ventions developed for major mishaps that primarily
involving maintenance activities such as engine repair
are likely not appropriate for ones of lesser severity that
involve other activities such as loading ordnance or tow-
ing aircraft. Presently, an in-depth analysis of all MRMs is
underway and it is planned to contrast major vs. minor
MRMs, MRMs occurring during maintenance, stores, and
ramp activities, and MRMs for specific communities.
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